The rise of o¤shoring of intermediate inputs raises important questions for commercial policy. Do the distinguishing features of o¤shoring introduce novel reasons for trade policy intervention? Does o¤shoring create new problems of global policy cooperation whose solutions require international agreements with novel features? In this paper we provide answers to these questions, and thereby initiate the study of trade agreements in the presence of o¤shoring. Our …ndings indicate that the rise of o¤shoring is likely to complicate the task of trade agreements for two reasons: …rst, the mechanism by which countries can shift the costs of intervention on to their trading partners is more complicated in the presence of o¤shoring and extends to a wider set of policies than is the case when o¤shoring is not present, and this implies that the agreements themselves must extend to a wider set of policies as well; and second, the underlying problem that a trade agreement must address in the presence of o¤shoring varies with the political preferences of member governments. As a consequence, the growing prevalence of o¤shoring is likely to make it increasingly di¢ cult for governments to rely on traditional GATT/WTO concepts and rules -such as market access, reciprocity and non-discrimination -to help them solve their trade-related problems.
Introduction
International trade in intermediate inputs is a prominent feature of the world economy. Using inputoutput and bilateral trade data for 87 countries and regions, Johnson and Noguera (2009) This surge in intermediate input trade seems to have been accompanied by a parallel increase in the share of di¤erentiated products in the total volume of world trade, and an associated fall in the share of goods traded on organized exchanges (also referred to as "homogeneous" goods). For instance, Rauch (1999) , reports that the share of goods traded on organized exchanges in the total volume of trade fell from 27.2% in 1980 to 12.6% in 1990. 2 Recent developments in international trade theory have attempted to bridge the apparent gap between the characteristics of international trade in the data and the standard representation of these trade ‡ows in terms of homogeneous …nal goods in neoclassical trade theory. One branch of this new literature has focused on incorporating input trade in otherwise standard models with homogeneous goods, perfectly competitive markets and frictionless contracting. 3 Another branch of the literature has emphasized that modeling "o¤shoring" as simply an increase in the fragmentation of production across countries misses important characteristics of intermediate input trade. 4 Prominent among these characteristics is that intermediate input purchases tend to be associated with signi…cant lock-in e¤ects for both buyers and sellers. For example, intermediate inputs are frequently customized to the needs of their intended buyers and hence embody a disproportionate amount of relationship-speci…c investments, which may be hard to recoup when transacting with alternative parties. Moreover, o¤shoring often involves the costly search for suitable foreign suppliers or foreign buyers, which makes separations costly and thereby provides another source of lock in. Because contracts involving international transactions are especially hard to enforce, the cross-border exchange of intermediate inputs cannot generally be governed by the same contractual safeguards that typically accompany similar exchanges occurring within borders. As a consequence, these lock-in e¤ects naturally result in prices that are determined by bilateral negotiations between suppliers and buyers, and that are therefore not (fully) disciplined by market-clearing considerations. We view the recent decline in the importance in world trade of goods traded on organized exchanges as a manifestation of these distinctive features of o¤shoring (though this decline can be attributed to other factors as well). 5 The rise of o¤shoring raises important questions for commercial policy. Do the distinguishing features of o¤shoring introduce novel reasons for trade policy intervention? Does o¤shoring create new problems of global policy cooperation whose solutions require international agreements with novel features? Can trade agreements that are designed to address problems that arise when trade predominantly takes the form of the exchange of …nal goods be expected to perform in a world where o¤shoring is prevalent?
In this paper we provide answers to these questions, and thereby initiate the study of trade agreements in the presence of o¤shoring. We adopt the simplest setting that can capture the main features of o¤shoring that we wish to study, and then later show that our main points are robust to a variety of generalizations. We consider two "small"countries, Home and Foreign, who face a …xed world price for a single homogeneous …nal good. Production of the …nal good requires a customized input; 6 all …nal good producers are located in Home; and all input suppliers are located in Foreign.
Contracts between suppliers and producers are incomplete, and so the terms of exchange between input suppliers and …nal good producers are determined by bargaining ex post (after investment in input supply has already been determined). Finally, we abstract initially from political economy concerns, and take real aggregate income as our measure of national and world welfare.
From this starting point, we investigate the role of trade policies. We assume that each country can apply taxes/subsidies to trade in the input and/or the …nal good. We …rst consider the case for free trade in this environment. As might be expected, with relationship-speci…c investments creating lock-in e¤ects and with contracts between buyers and producers being incomplete, an international hold-up problem arises, and this leads to an ine¢ ciently low volume of input trade across countries under free trade. It is therefore natural that an activist role for trade policy exists in our model, because trade policies which encourage input trade volume can serve as a substitute for the more standard contractual safeguards available in domestic transactions and can thereby help bring countries closer to the e¢ ciency frontier. In fact we show that an appropriate choice of input trade subsidies, combined with free trade in …nal goods, can fully resolve the international hold-up problem and allow countries to attain the …rst-best. Importantly, though, the mechanism by which trade policies a¤ect input trade volumes in this environment is by altering the conditions of expost bargaining between foreign suppliers and domestic producers, and this mechanism is therefore distinct from the standard manner that trade volumes respond to trade policy intervention in the commercial policy literature (through shifts in foreign export supply and/or domestic import demand and their implications for international market-clearing conditions).
We next ask whether the Nash equilibrium policy choices of governments coincide with the internationally e¢ cient policies. We …nd that they do not, and we identify two dimensions of international ine¢ ciency that arise under Nash policies. A …rst dimension is an ine¢ ciently low Nunn and Tre ‡er (2008) also substantiate the empirical relevance of the aforementioned non-standard features of o¤shoring.
input trade volume. Intuitively, trade policy serves a dual role in this environment. On the one hand, as indicated above, subsidies to the exchange of intermediate inputs can serve as a substitute for more standard contractual safeguards available in domestic transactions and can thus increase the volume of input trade toward its e¢ cient level. On the other hand, input trade taxes can be used to redistribute surplus across countries, thereby shifting some of the cost of intervention on to trading partners. For instance, although an export tax may reduce the incentive of foreign suppliers to invest, these suppliers will be able to pass part of the cost of the tax on to Home …nal-good producers in their ex-post bargaining. Moreover, we show that the home government will also distort trade in the …nal good away from its free-trade level in order to reduce the domestic …nal good price and further shift bargaining surplus from foreign input suppliers to home …nal good producers. This leads to the second dimension of international e¢ ciency that arises under Nash policies: an ine¢ ciently low …nal good price in the home market.
There is hence a basic tension that each government faces in its unilateral trade policy choices between correcting the international hold-up problem and capturing surplus from/shifting costs onto its trading partner. It is this tension that prevents governments from making internationally e¢ cient policy choices in the Nash equilibrium.
We then turn to the role of trade agreements in this setting. Our description above suggests an important distinction between the Nash policy ine¢ ciencies that arise in the presence of o¤-shoring and those that arise according to the "terms-of-trade theory" that characterizes much of the existing trade agreements literature. According to the terms-of-trade theory, in the absence of a trade agreement governments are stuck in a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners'Dilemma, in which they succumb to international cost-shifting incentives and restrict trade volumes to ine¢ ciently low levels on those products where they can exert market power in international markets. With o¤shoring, governments also succumb to international cost-shifting incentives in the absence of a trade agreement, as we have described above; and it is also true as a result of these incentives that governments restrict trade volumes to ine¢ ciently low levels on those products (intermediate inputs) where they can exert market power. But in the presence of o¤shoring, as we have described, the home country also distorts trade in the …nal good in order to reduce the domestic …nal good price for purposes of international cost-shifting, even when, as we have assumed, the home country cannot exert market power in the international market for the …nal good. This leads to our …rst broad conclusion: the rise in o¤shoring is likely to complicate the task of trade agreements, because in the presence of o¤shoring the mechanism by which countries can shift the costs of intervention on to their trading partners extends to a wider set of policies than is the case when o¤shoring is not present, creating the need for negotiations that then must extend beyond the traditional GATT/WTO "market access" concerns to a wider set of policies as well.
We next introduce the possibility that governments are motivated in part by political economy/redistributive concerns. We show that the introduction of political economy motives into our model can eliminate unrealistic policy predictions (e.g., convert import subsidies to import taxes and export taxes to export subsidies), but we con…rm that the implications of o¤shoring for the comparison between Nash and e¢ cient trade policies as described above is preserved. More specifically, we establish that su¢ ciently politically motivated governments will adopt import tari¤s and export subsidies in the Nash equilibrium, but we show that Nash policies still imply ine¢ ciently low input trade volume and an ine¢ ciently low price of the …nal good in the home market.
When we ask whether these ine¢ ciencies can still be attributed to international cost-shifting incentives once the political motivations of governments are introduced, however, we …nd a surprising answer: a new ine¢ ciency arises in the Nash equilibrium that cannot be given a cost-shifting interpretation, and which instead re ‡ects a lack of coordination between home and foreign policies for achieving the desired level of politically-driven foreign export promotion. This …nding is in stark contrast to the predictions of the terms-of-trade theory, where the presence or absence of political economy motives has no impact on the underlying problem that a trade agreement must solve. And it implies that, if governments have political economy motivations, an e¤ective trade agreement must serve two roles in the presence of o¤shoring: it must solve the international costshifting problem (i.e., provide governments with an avenue of escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners'Dilemma); and it must coordinate the setting of policies across countries so as to reduce the dead weight loss associated with export promotion programs for traded intermediate inputs.
This leads to our second broad conclusion: the rise in o¤shoring is likely to complicate the task of trade agreements, because in the presence of o¤shoring the underlying problem that a trade agreement must address varies with the political preferences of member governments. As a consequence, under the view that governments operate in the presence of important political economy forces, our results indicate that the growing prevalence of o¤shoring is likely to make it increasingly di¢ cult for governments to rely on general rules -such as the traditional GATT/WTO pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination -to help them solve their trade-related problems.
Our paper is related to several literatures. First, as emphasized above, by exploring the role of trade agreements in a model with intermediate input trade and in an environment with relationshipspeci…c investments and incomplete contracting, we complement and extend an established literature on international trade agreements (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2010 , for a recent review). In suggesting a novel rationale for trade agreements, our paper also complements the recent papers of Ossa (2008) and Mrazova (2009) . Second, by considering endogenous trade policy choices in this environment, we complement and extend a recent literature that has begun to study the impacts of (exogenous) tari¤s on international hold-up problems. Ornelas and Turner (2008a) develop a model in which import tari¤s on intermediate inputs are shown to aggravate the hold-up problem in international vertical relationships, with the implication that trade liberalization may lead to a larger increase in trade ‡ows than in standard models. Ornelas and Turner do not however study optimal trade policies or the possibility of trade agreements in their framework. 7; 8 McLaren (1997) studies the desirability of announcing a future trade liberalization in a model where producers incur 7 The independent paper of Ornelas and Turner (2008b) does begin to explore the welfare implications of tari¤s in this kind of environment, but they do not consider the role of trade agreements. 8 Similarly, Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Diez (2008) study the e¤ect of trade frictions on the choice of organizational form of …rms contemplating o¤shoring, but they also treat trade frictions as exogenous. sunk costs to service foreign markets, but his framework emphasizes commitment problems from which we completely abstract. 9 Finally, while the broad conclusions we emphasize above do not require that bilateral bargaining over price necessarily leads to a hold-up problem, we choose to derive our results in a setting where the international hold-up problem would arise in the absence of government intervention. In this regard there is a large literature proposing a variety of mechanism-design resolutions to the holdup ine¢ ciencies caused by incomplete contracts. These resolutions however generally rely on the ability of parties to commit not to renegotiate an initial contract and also on the existence of a third party that can enforce o¤-the-equilibrium-path penalties. 10 We view our international context as one in which these alternative resolutions of the hold-up problem are naturally more problematic, and thus trade taxes and subsidies may be particularly useful in resolving these ine¢ ciencies. For this same reason, we …nd it natural to simplify our model in a way that downplays sources of domestic hold-up ine¢ ciencies. 11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a Benchmark Model that introduces the international hold-up problem and illustrates the role of active second-best trade policies. In section 3, we consider Nash equilibrium policy choices when governments maximize national income and show that Nash policies are ine¢ cient, and we explore the role and design of trade agreements in this setting. Section 4 extends the analysis of the Benchmark Model to include political economy motives. In section 5, we consider a variety of further extensions of the model.
We o¤er some concluding remarks in section 6.
The Benchmark Model
We begin this section by describing a benchmark two-small-country trade model in which …nal good producers in the home country import inputs from suppliers in the foreign country. We refer to this model as the Benchmark Model. While simple and special along a number of dimensions, the Benchmark Model is meant to highlight the essential features of the basic international hold-up problem which arises under free trade. After presenting the setup and characterizing the free-trade equilibrium, we derive the (second-best) trade policies that maximize world welfare.
Setup
We consider a world of two small countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F ), and a large rest-of-world whose only role in the model is to …x the price at which a …nal good 1 is available to H and F on world markets (the direction of trade in good 1 is not speci…ed and is immaterial). Consumer 9 Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1992) also emphasize commitment problems associated with trade relationships that involve substantial relationship-(or market-) speci…c investments, but they focus on how these issues a¤ect the choice between unilateral liberalization, bilateral agreements and multilateral agreements.
1 0 Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Chapter 12 ) review the insights and limitations of this literature. 1 1 In related work, Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) show that, in a closed economy setup, a government can use taxation to alleviate the hold-up problem between domestic buyers and sellers. preferences are identical in H and F and given by
where c j i is consumption of good i 2 f0; 1g in country j 2 fH; F g, and where u 0 > 0 and u 00 < 0. Good 0, which we take to be the numeraire, is assumed to be costlessly traded and available in su¢ cient quantities that it is always consumed in positive amounts in both H and F . Good 1 is produced with a customized intermediate input x according to the production function y (x), with y(0) = 0, y 0 (x) > 0 and y 00 (x) < 0. By choice of units for measuring the quantity of good 1, we set its (…xed) price on world markets equal to 1. For now we assume that trade in good 1 is free, so that its price is equal to 1 everywhere in the world.
Notice that the concavity of y (x) implies y (x) =x > y 0 (x) for x > 0. We impose as well an additional condition on the curvature properties of y (x):
As we establish later, this condition ensures that the home country improves its terms of trade when it imposes a tari¤ on imports of the intermediate input x, and it thereby rules out the Lerner Paradox in the Benchmark Model. 12 We suppose that the home country H is inhabited by a unit measure of producers of the …nal good 1, while the foreign country F is inhabited by a unit measure of suppliers of the intermediate input x. Hence, to produce the …nal good 1, producers in H must import inputs from suppliers in F . Suppliers in F tailor their inputs speci…cally to the needs of a …nal good producer in H and, for simplicity, these inputs are assumed to be useless to alternative …nal good producers. We assume that the marginal cost of input production in F (measured in terms of the numeraire) is constant and, through choice of the units in which inputs are measured, we normalize it to 1. For now, we also assume that trade in x is free.
We next turn to focus on the nature of the bilateral relationship between a …nal good producer in H and an input supplier in F , which comprises the essence of the model. We adopt a setting of incomplete contracts between …nal good producers and input suppliers. In our Benchmark Model, contractual incompleteness can be rationalized in the following simple way. Following Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Antràs (2003) , we assume that, when investing in the supply of x, the supplier can choose between manufacturing a high-quality or a low-quality input, and the latter can be produced at lower cost but is useless to …nal good producers. The quantity of x is observable to everyone and therefore veri…able by third-parties, but we assume that the quality of x is only observable to the supplier and producer in the particular bilateral relationship, and so qualitycontingent contracts are not available. Although parties could still sign a contract specifying a price and a quantity, if they did so, the supplier would always have an incentive to produce the low quality input (at lower cost) and still receive the same contractually stipulated price.
Hence, in this environment, no (enforceable) contracts are signed between suppliers and producers prior to the initial supplier investment decisions. And without an initial contract, the price at which each supplier in F sells its inputs to a producer in H is then decided ex-post (through bargaining) once quality has been chosen. We follow the bulk of the literature in assuming that the bargained price is determined through Nash bargaining. Because parties have symmetric information at the bargaining stage, ex-post e¢ ciency ensures that low-quality production will never be chosen by an input supplier in equilibrium, and so only high-quality inputs are produced: as a result, the input-quality dimension of the model can be kept in the background henceforth.
We now describe the structure of the bilateral producer-supplier relationship in detail. We assume that all agents have an ex-ante zero outside option. The sequence of events is as follows:
stage 1. The unit measure of producers in H and suppliers in F are randomly matched, producing a unit measure of matches. Each agent decides whether to stay with his match or exit the market. In the former case, the producer provides the supplier with a list of customized input speci…cations. In the latter case, each agent obtains his ex-ante outside option (equal to zero).
stage 2. Each supplier decides on the amount x of customized input to be produced (at marginal cost of 1).
stage 3. Each producer-supplier pair bargains over the price of the intermediate input. We consider the generalized Nash bargaining solution with weights and (1 ) for the home producer and foreign supplier, respectively, where 2 (0; 1).
stage 4. Each producer in H imports x from its partner-supplier and produces the …nal good with the acquired x, and payments agreed in stage 3 are settled.
This 4-stage game generates the simple hold-up problem that provides the starting point for our analysis. A number of features of this setup are worth noting at this point.
First, we rule out the use of ex-ante (stage-1) lump-sum transfers between producers and suppliers. The feasibility of these transfers is particularly hard to defend in the international context that we study, where such transfers and the obligations associated with them might be di¢ cult to enforce. In section 5, however, we show that our main results are robust to allowing for these transfers. Second, we assume a frictionless matching process in stage 1 to keep our Benchmark Model simple: in section 5 we introduce (ex-ante) search frictions. Third, the role of the speci…city of input x is to pin down the outside options of the producer and the supplier should their stage-3 bargaining break down. In our Benchmark Model we take an extreme view of the degree of speci…city, so that the breakup of a bargaining pair in stage 3 would result in a zero outside option for both producer and supplier. We also relax this assumption in section 5, where we introduce a secondary market for inputs. As argued in the Introduction, we could altogether dispense with the assumption of speci…city of inputs by introducing (ex-post) search frictions, which would again drive a wedge between the value of remaining in a match and the value of dissolving that match. In fact, our Benchmark Model is isomorphic to a model with extreme (ex-post) search frictions, in which a separation implies that each party …nds an alternative trading partner with probability 0. Our less extreme framework in section 5 is isomorphic to a model with less extreme search frictions. Finally, our model also assumes that all suppliers are located in Foreign, and that the hold-up problem is one-sided. These assumptions will also be relaxed in section 5.
Having discussed our model assumptions, we note that production e¢ ciency requires that the customized input is produced at a level x E which satis…es
and thereby equates the marginal revenue generated from an additional unit of the input (recall that the price of the …nal good is …xed by world markets and equal to 1 under free trade) with the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the input (which is constant and normalized to 1).
Free Trade Equilibrium
We now characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of the 4-stage game described above. The characterization follows very simply from a few key observations. We consider a representative producer in H and supplier in F that are matched in stage 1.
First, if the producer uses the supplier's input to produce the …nal good in stage 4, its revenue is given by y (x). Second, as observed in the previous section, the outside options of both the producer and the supplier in their stage-3 Nash bargain are 0, and hence the quasi-rents over which the producer and supplier bargain in stage 3 are y (x) (recall that the cost of producing x is sunk at this point). Therefore, in the Nash bargain of stage 3, the …nal good producer in H obtains a payo¤ equal to y (x) and the input supplier in F is left with a payo¤ of (1 ) y (x).
Next, rolling back to stage 2, observe that the input supplier chooses x to maximize (1 ) y (x)
x, so the optimal quantityx of input satis…es
Given the concavity of y (x), it is clear from a comparison of (4) with (3) thatx < x E as long as > 0. This is the under-investment associated with the hold-up problem, and it re ‡ects the fact that the producer and supplier bargain over the price of the input after the supplier has already sunk investment in input supply. Only if the supplier were to have full bargaining power ( ! 0)
would the hold-up ine¢ ciencies disappear.
Finally, consider stage 1. If the producer hands the supplier a list of customized input speci…-cations, the producer anticipates obtaining a payo¤ equal to
which exceeds the payo¤ he would obtain by not providing the speci…cations (recall that the ex-ante outside option of producers is equal to 0). Similarly, by agreeing to form a partnership with the home producer, the supplier anticipates obtaining a payo¤ of
which also exceeds his ex-ante outside option. 13 In sum, no separations will occur at stage 1. Note also that the sum of payo¤s of the two parties is equal to y (x) x, which is strictly less than the sum of payo¤s that would obtain when investment is chosen at the e¢ cient level x E de…ned by (3).
Now consider the measure of social welfare in each country implied by our Benchmark Model.
With our assumption of quasilinear preferences, this measure is given by consumer surplus plus pro…ts plus trade tax revenue (the latter being zero under free trade). 14 Using (1), we have that country j's demand for good 1 is given by
dp where p is the "choke" price for country j's demand of good 1. World aggregate welfare under free trade may then be represented by
which is strictly lower than world welfare in the presence of production e¢ ciency because y (x) x < y x E x E . We summarize this discussion with:
Proposition 1 In the Benchmark Model, a hold-up problem exists under free trade, leading to an ine¢ ciently low volume of input trade (x < x E ).
Proposition 1 records the existence of a basic international hold-up problem that arises in the presence of free trade. Intuitively, the combination of incomplete contracting and input customization gives rise to bilateral exchanges that are not fully disciplined by market-wide-clearing prices and partly re ‡ect the characteristics of the agents engaged in the relationship, such as their relative bargaining power. In particular, with free trade, foreign suppliers end up selling their input at a price equal to (1 ) y (x) =x. This ex-post haggling over prices leads suppliers to capture only a fraction of the return to their investments, and naturally we have thatx < x E .
At this point, there are a variety of mechanism-design resolutions to the hold-up ine¢ ciencies caused by incomplete contracts that we might consider. However, we view our international context as one in which these mechanism-design resolutions are naturally more problematic because they generally rely on the ability of parties to commit not to renegotiate an initial contract and also on the existence of a third party that can enforce o¤-the-equilibrium-path penalties. In this light, trade taxes and subsidies may be particularly useful as an alternative route to resolving these ine¢ ciencies.
We therefore next turn to consider trade intervention as a possible means of alleviating the hold-up problem.
1 3 Given the concavity of y (x), we have (1 ) y (x) x (1 )xy 0 (x) x = 0. 1 4 Strictly speaking, social welfare should also include a term related to income earned by other factors of production (say labor) in the economy. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to close the model in a way that makes this term independent of policies in sector 1 (see, for instance, Grossman and Helpman, 1994) . Henceforth, we simply ignore this term.
Second-Best Trade Policy
In this section, we explore the possible bene…cial role of trade policy in this distorted economy.
To this end, we let H x denote the trade tax imposed by H on imports of the input x (positive if an import tari¤, negative if an import subsidy) de…ned in speci…c terms, and we let F x be the analogous trade tax imposed by F (positive if an export tax, negative if an export subsidy).
Furthermore, we let H 1 denote the trade tax imposed by H on the home country's trade in the …nal good 1 (positive if an import tari¤ or export subsidy, negative if an import subsidy or export tax) also de…ned in speci…c terms. Observe that the price of the …nal good 1 in H is now given by p H 1 = 1 + H 1 , whereas the price of the input x continues to be determined by Nash bargaining between producers and suppliers (though trade taxes may a¤ect this negotiated price). 15 How does the introduction of these trade taxes a¤ect the equilibrium characterized in the previous section? To explore this question, we …rst consider the case of second-best trade policies, that is, the set of policies that maximize aggregate world welfare (subject to the contractual frictions in producer-supplier relationships). More speci…cally, we introduce the following stage 0 which occurs prior to stage 1 of the 4-stage game described in section 2.1: stage 0. A social planner selects a home-country trade tax H 1 on the …nal good 1, a home-country import tax H x on home imports of the input x, and a foreign-country export tax F x on foreign exports of the input x.
After the social planner has selected these import tari¤s/subsidies in stage 0, the sequence of events is as outlined in section 2.1 (with trade taxes collected at the time of importation and production/sales in stage 4).
Consider now how these trade policy choices in stage 0 a¤ect the equilibrium outcome of the game. In their stage-3 bargaining, if the producer and supplier reach an agreement they stand to obtain a joint payo¤ of (recalling again that the cost of producing x is sunk at that point)
where we use x H x + F x to denote the sum of the home and foreign tax on input trade. A positive import tari¤ or export subsidy on the …nal good ( H 1 > 0) raises the joint surplus of the producer and supplier because it raises the price at which the …nal good is sold in H. Conversely, a positive import tari¤ ( H x > 0) or export tax ( F x > 0) on inputs reduces the joint surplus of the producer and supplier because it transfers part of the surplus to governments.
If the producer and the supplier do not reach an agreement, each is again left with a zero outside option. Hence, the …nal good producer obtains a payo¤ equal to 1 + H 1 y (x) x x in the 1 5 We could also allow for a …nal-good trade tax F 1 in the foreign country, but it is intuitively clear (and is easily shown) that there will be no incentive to intervene with such an instrument, since this could only alter the local price of good 1 in F (owing to F 's small size on world markets) and that price has no impact on the hold-up problem between F 's input suppliers and H's …nal good producers. In the online Appendix we discuss the case where F is large in the world market for the …nal good and a reason for intervention with F 1 arises. Note also that we are assuming that all trade taxes are speci…c. In section 5, we brie ‡y discuss the case of ad valorem taxes and subsidies. Nash bargain of stage 3, and the input supplier obtains (1 ) 1 + H 1 y (x) x x and chooses x in stage 2 to satisfy 16
which implicitly de…nesx( H 1 ; x ). It is clear from (5) thatx is increasing in H 1 and decreasing in x , the sum of H x and F x . Intuitively, incomplete contracting leads to rent-sharing between the producer and supplier, and the latter's incentives to invest tend to be higher whenever the surplus from investment is higher, that is when H 1 is higher and when x is lower. We will con…rm in later sections that the positive dependence ofx on H 1 and the negative dependence ofx on x hold for a variety of speci…cations of the game played between the producer and supplier.
At stage 1, the …nal good producer in H anticipates a payo¤ equal to
while the supplier in F expects a payo¤ equal to
As a result, and recalling that x H x + F x , welfare in H inclusive of tax revenue is given by
while welfare in F is
We now seek to characterize the set of trade policy choices that maximize world welfare. Formally, we seek the policies that maximize
where recall that W H and W F are de…ned subject tox( H 1 ; x ) as determined by (5). 17 But notice that
Hence, while W H and W F each depend on the individual values of H x and F x , world welfare depends only on x , the sum of H x and F x . This implies that the second-best policies will only pin down the sum of the home and foreign tax on input trade, x , in addition to H 1 . The e¢ cient policies HE
1
and E x are then determined by the following …rst-order conditions of the problem above: 18
The …rst-order conditions in (8) are instructive. Recalling from (5) that @x=@ H 1 > 0, it is clear from (8) that the optimal choice of H 1 is strictly positive, provided that [y 0 (x) 1] > 0 which by (3) implies thatx < x E : this suggests that an import tari¤ or export subsidy on trade in the …nal good 1 could raise welfare in the world, by increasingx toward x E and thereby helping to ameliorate the hold-up problem at the cost of lost consumer surplus. However, recalling from (5) that @x=@ x < 0, it is clear from (8) that the optimal choice of x must ensure that [y 0 (x) 1] = 0, thereby achieving productive e¢ ciency: there is no associated loss in consumer surplus when the tari¤ on imported inputs x is used to increasex, and the optimal choice of x therefore solves completely the hold-up problem and achieves productive e¢ ciency. This in turn leaves no reason for government intervention with regard to trade in the …nal good 1. Hence, the optimal choice of H 1 is HE 1 = 0. On the other hand, the second-best policies do call for intervention with regards to input trade. In particular, from equation (5) it follows that the optimal trade tax is an input subsidy in an amount equal to E x HE x
. We may thus state:
Proposition 2 In the Benchmark Model, the second-best trade policy choices maintain free trade in the …nal good and subsidize importation of the input so as to solve the hold-up problem and achieve an e¢ cient volume of input trade (x = x E ).
The intuition for Proposition 2 is simple. The hold-up problem between producers in H and suppliers in F results in a level of imported inputs which is ine¢ ciently low. The market failure is an international one in nature, and thus it is natural that trade taxes or subsidies can serve a useful role in alleviating the ine¢ ciency. Furthermore, although trade intervention in the …nal good could be used to raise the home-country price of the …nal good and increase the volume of imported inputs (through rent-sharing), this would come at a cost of reduced home-country consumer surplus.
A subsidy to imported inputs does not reduce consumer surplus, but it nevertheless succeeds in increasing the volume of imported inputs by increasing the surplus over which the parties negotiate in the ex-post (stage-3) bargain. As a consequence, a subsidy to imported inputs targets just the distorted margin, and in analogy with the targeting principle (Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963, Johnson, 1965) is hence the optimal method of addressing the problem.
We have thus identi…ed a novel role for trade policy intervention, namely, as a means of addressing the international hold-up problem that arises when international trade involves signi…cant lock-in e¤ects between domestic producers and their foreign suppliers. A natural question is whether 1 8 It is easily checked that second-order conditions are satis…ed (see Appendix A.1).
the unilateral trade policy choices of both the home and foreign governments will lead to overall trade interventions that concord with the e¢ ciency conditions outlined in Proposition 2. We tackle this issue in the next section.
Nash Trade Policy and the Role of Trade Agreements
In this section we characterize the Nash policies of the home and foreign governments and evaluate the potential role of trade agreements in our Benchmark Model. In order to build intuition, we …rst consider the unilaterally optimal trade policy choices of the home government when the foreign government follows a policy of free trade, and only later consider the possibility of foreign trade policy intervention.
Unilateral Home Policy
To characterize the unilaterally optimal trade policy choices of the home government when the foreign government follows a policy of free trade, we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
The optimal choice of H 1 and H x , which we denote by^ H 1 and^ H x , must maximize home welfare W H , and will hence satisfy the …rst-order conditions
where in writing these conditions we have used the de…nition of H ( H 1 ; H x ) implied by (6). 20 Applying the implicit function theorem (twice) tox(
, which can be used to manipulate the above …rst-order conditions to obtain:
The expressions in (9) re ‡ect an interesting logic. Part of the goal of the home government in intervening with H 1 and/or H x , as in the case of second-best policies, is to raisex towards its e¢ cient level x E . Nevertheless, the home government does not maximize world welfare and hence there is an o¤setting leakage of bargaining surplus to the foreign supplier that must be taken into account by the home government in setting its optimal unilateral policies. This leads to two observations: …rst, it is not optimal for the home government to deliver the chosenx using only H x , and the setting of H 1 6 = 0 re ‡ects a new and independent source of international ine¢ ciency associated with the unilateral policy choices of the home country; and second, it is not optimal for the home government to raisex all the way to its e¢ cient level x E .
The …rst observation can be understood as follows. The home government must concern itself with two tasks as it considers its policy choices. First, it must face foreign suppliers with the appropriate marginal incentives for investment in the supply of x so as to achieve the desired investment levelx. Second, the home government must also concern itself with extracting inframarginal bargaining surplus from foreign suppliers through the use of trade policy instruments.
With its two tari¤ instruments H
1 and H x , the home government can extract inframarginal foreign surplus with adjustments in H 1 and H x that holdx …xed according to (5), so that
, and can extract foreign surplus in this fashion at the rate
Evidently, with the concavity of y(x) implying [
, it follows from (10) that for any given level ofx, additional bargaining surplus can be extracted from foreign suppliers by reducing H 1 and accompanying this with a reduction in H x which preserves the level ofx. Intuitively, while we have seen that a positive …nal good tari¤ H 1 could be used to induce greater investment from foreign suppliers, from the perspective of foreign surplus extraction it is an inferior method for doing so relative to a subsidy to imported inputs H x , because H 1 must work through the …nal good production function y(x) -which is concave -and this creates more infra-marginal bargaining surplus for foreign suppliers relative to H x , which works directly (and linearly) through import
What, then, prevents the home country from lowering H 1 and H x in this fashion inde…nitely, until all of the bargaining surplus has been extracted from foreign suppliers? The impact on homecountry welfare of these tari¤ changes is given by
As the …rst term of equation (11) makes clear, what eventually stops this process of foreign surplus extraction is the growing home-country …nal good demand distortions that are associated with
It is for these reasons that (9) implies^ H 1 < 0: in words, it is unilaterally optimal for the home government to utilize trade policy to distort downward the price of the …nal good 1 in the home market (through either an import subsidy or an export tax on the …nal good) as a means of extracting bargaining surplus from foreign suppliers. Finally, note that with F x 0, world welfare (the sum of home and foreign welfare) is given by W W ( H 1 ; H x ) as de…ned in the previous section with H x taking the place of x . It therefore follows that (10) and (11) together imply
which is strictly positive for H 1 < 0. In words, setting H 1 < 0 is ine¢ cient from the point of view of aggregate world welfare for any level ofx; and in fact as (12) indicates, world welfare is maximized conditional on any level ofx by setting H 1 = 0. Hence, our model identi…es a new and independent source of international ine¢ ciency -in addition to the ine¢ ciently low input trade volumex -when the home country sets its tari¤s unilaterally: the attempt to extract bargaining surplus from foreign input suppliers by distorting the home market price of the …nal good.
The second observation above, that it is not optimal for the home country to raisex all the way to its e¢ cient level x E , can be con…rmed by considering the expression for^ H x in (9). This expression is of indeterminate sign, indicating that^ H x can now be either negative (an import subsidy on inputs of x) or positive (an import tari¤ on inputs of x): this re ‡ects the tension that arises for the home-country government between correcting the hold-up problem and capturing surplus from the foreign input supplier, a tension that was absent in the choice of second-best policies in section 2.3. To show formally that the home government will not raisex to the e¢ cient level, we use F x 0 and substitute (5) into the expression for^ H x in (9), and simplify to obtain
which implies thatx < x E . Hence, at least when the foreign government remains passive, it is unilaterally optimal for the home government to utilize its trade policies in a way that does not fully correct the international hold-up problem.
We can thus conclude that, when only H intervenes, international e¢ ciency is not achieved.
Instead, there are now two sources of international ine¢ ciency that arise: an ine¢ ciently low input trade volume that results from the continued existence of the international hold-up problem; and distortions in the …nal good market that arise as a result of the home-country's attempts to extract bargaining surplus from foreign suppliers. We may thus state:
Proposition 3 In the Benchmark Model, when only H intervenes with trade policy, its unilaterally optimal policy choices lead to (i) an ine¢ ciently low volume of input trade (x < x E ), and (ii) an ine¢ ciently low local price for the …nal good in H's market.
Proposition 3 stands in marked contrast to Proposition 2, and re ‡ects a simple point. To the extent that home-country producers share part of the surplus from production with foreign suppliers (as is the case in our Benchmark Model), the unilateral incentives of the home-country government to intervene with trade policy to mitigate the international hold-up problem will be muted by the fact that foreign suppliers enjoy some of the bene…ts of this intervention. In this environment, the home-country's unilateral intervention must be concerned as well with capturing bargaining surplus from foreign input suppliers, and therefore the home country cannot be counted on to solve the international hold-up problem on its own. Moreover, the home-country's attempts to extract bargaining surplus from foreign input suppliers will spill over into the home …nal good market as well, and introduce additional distortions there.
Foreign Intervention and Nash Policy Choices
We turn next to consider the unilateral incentives of the foreign government to intervene with a trade tax F x (as before, in a prior stage 0). We hence modify stage 0 as follows:
stage 0. The home government H selects a trade tax H 1 on the …nal good 1, and a trade tax H x on the imported input x; simultaneously, the foreign government F selects a trade tax F x on the exported input x. 21 We start by considering F 's incentive to intervene facing a given H policy pair H 1 ; H x . We earlier de…ned the foreign welfare function W F ( H 1 ; H x ; F x ). Using this, the de…nition of x , and the functionsx( H 1 ; x ) and F ( H 1 ; x ) de…ned by (5) and (7), respectively, the optimal choice of F x , which we denote by^ F x , must satisfy the …rst-order condition
Recalling that @x=@ x < 0, the …rst-order condition in (14) together with (5) immediately implies
and hence, the foreign country …nds it optimal to set an export tax on the intermediate input.
The logic behind this result can be understood as follows. First, why doesn't F 's government o¤er an export subsidy to increase exports of x and help address the hold-up problem? The reason is that the level of x is already chosen by the foreign supplier to maximize foreign pro…ts, and so there is no gain to the foreign country from manipulating this choice with export-sector intervention. And second, foreign suppliers do not bear the full cost of the increase in the marginal cost of production associated with an export tax, because they have less than full bargaining power in their negotiations with …nal good producers ( > 0). Hence, the foreign government is able to pass part of the cost of the export tax on to the home country while keeping the entire bene…t from it (in the form of tax revenue). As a result, the optimal export tax is positive.
How will the home country respond to the setting of an export tax by F ? In order to derive the (5) and (6), respectively, the associated …rst-order conditions can be manipulated after replacing is indeterminate. This parallels the results we obtain in the case without foreign retaliation as recorded in (9), and the intuition is the same as that outlined above. The only di¤erence is the additional term^ with equations (5) and (15) we further obtain:
It is then clear that the Nash equilibrium involves suboptimal trade in intermediate inputs,
In sum, we have shown that:
Proposition 4 In the Nash equilibrium of the Benchmark Model, F maintains free trade in the …nal good and taxes the exports of the input, while H intervenes in both the …nal good and input markets, resulting in (i) an ine¢ ciently low volume of input trade (x < x E ), and (ii) an ine¢ -ciently low local price for the …nal good in H's market.
The Role of Trade Agreements
We now turn to the role of trade agreements. Proposition 4 identi…es two ine¢ ciencies associated with Nash policies that a trade agreement could correct, and thereby provides the basis for understanding the role of a trade agreement in the presence of o¤shoring. This points to a key implication. According to Proposition 4, the role of a trade agreement in the presence of o¤shoring is not limited to expanding input trade volumes to e¢ cient levels. Rather, in the presence of o¤-shoring, the role of a trade agreement extends as well to the elimination of local price distortions that would otherwise be present in the home country …nal good market, even given an e¢ cient volume of input trade. Hence, an agreement on input trade volume alone cannot achieve the e¢ ciency frontier in the presence of o¤shoring. As we emphasize further below, this distinguishes the role of a trade agreement in the presence of o¤shoring from its role according to much of the existing trade agreements literature, which adopts the perspective of the "terms-of-trade theory."
To see that an agreement on input trade volume alone cannot achieve the e¢ ciency frontier in the presence of o¤shoring, consider the following thought experiment. Let us suppose that the home and foreign governments agree to implement the e¢ cient input trade volume x E with the following procedure. The foreign government agrees to the tari¤ level F x ; and the home government may choose any combination of H 1 and H x that satis…esx(
With the freedom to choose unilaterally its preferred mix of policies so long as these policies satisfyx( H 1 ; H x + F x ) = x E , the home government policy choices must then satisfy the …rst-order condition
But this implies that the home government will choose to set H 1 < 0, and hence will continue to utilize trade policy to distort downward the price of the …nal good 1 in the home market (through either an import subsidy or an export tax on the …nal good) as a means of extracting bargaining surplus from foreign suppliers.
According to our Benchmark Model, then, to achieve an e¢ cient outcome in the presence of o¤shoring a trade agreement must constrain not only H x and F x , and therefore x , but it must constrain H 1 as well. This implication contrasts sharply with the implications of the terms-oftrade theory. As Bagwell and Staiger (2001) have demonstrated, in a wide variety of settings where terms-of-trade manipulation is the problem for a trade agreement to solve, it is possible to reach the international e¢ ciency frontier with trade negotiations that are structured so as to achieve e¢ cient trade volumes based on a parsimonious set of tari¤ commitments and the "market access" that these commitments imply, leaving each country free to choose unilaterally the best way to deliver this access with its preferred mix of policies. 22 The access commitment implied by negotiated tari¤ 2 2 While Bagwell and Staiger (2001) consider tari¤s and domestic standards, the analogous result in our model of o¤shoring would be that governments can achieve e¢ cient policy combinations by negotiating over Importantly, the settings considered by Bagwell and Staiger (2001) all share the property that international prices are determined by market-clearing, and this leads to a feature that is key for their result: as Bagwell and Staiger emphasize, policy adjustments by one country that do not alter trade volumes do not alter international prices either (and vice versa), and hence cannot e¤ect the country's trading partners. And it is because of this feature that a country acting unilaterally can be expected to make internationally e¢ cient policy choices when it is held to its market-access commitments. As we have emphasized above, however, this feature does not hold in the Benchmark Model, because the international price (i.e., the price at which the input is exchanged between the foreign supplier and the domestic buyer) is determined by bilateral bargaining, not by a market clearing condition. Rather, in the Benchmark Model adjustments in the home policies H 1 and H x that preserve the volume of input tradex nevertheless alter the price at which bilateral exchange occurs and hence, as (10) con…rms, alter the level of foreign supplier surplus; and as a result, such adjustments will alter foreign welfare and cannot be counted on to lead the home country to make e¢ cient unilateral policy choices. As a consequence, reaching the e¢ ciency frontier generally requires negotiations over H x and F x and H 1 in the Benchmark Model. 23 We summarize this discussion in:
Proposition 5 The rise in o¤ shoring complicates the task of trade agreements, because in the presence of o¤ shoring the international cost-shifting mechanism extends to a wider set of policies than is the case when o¤ shoring is not present, and this requires that negotiations must then extend to a wider set of policies as well.
It is worth emphasizing that the statements in Propositions 4 and 5 continue to be true even when the hold-up ine¢ ciencies under free trade in the Benchmark Model disappear. More speci…-cally, recall that when ! 0, foreign suppliers have full bargaining power and the level of investment under free trade is at its e¢ cient level (i.e.,x ! x E ), thereby implying that the second-best policies call for no trade intervention ( HE 1 = 0, E x ! 0). Nevertheless, as the expressions in (16) and (17) make clear,^ HN 1 < 0 and y 0 (x) > 1 even when ! 0, and thus Nash policies continue to exhibit the same two ine¢ ciencies in that case. As we have explained above, this re ‡ects the fact that the key feature of the Benchmark Model which is responsible for the novel results on the role and design of trade agreements is not the hold-up ine¢ ciencies associated with lock-in e¤ects, but rather the bilateral determination of prices resulting from these lock-in e¤ects. 24 2 3 Our model of o¤shoring di¤ers from the typical model used in the trade-agreements literature in two ways: …rst, it emphasizes input trade; and second, the international price of the traded input is determined by bilateral bargaining. We establish in the online Appendix, however, that a model of input trade in which the international price of the traded input is determined by a market clearing condition does not exhibit the novel properties that our o¤shoring model exhibits, which is why we can attribute these properties to the novel manner in which international prices are determined in our model. 2 4 As can also be con…rmed from (16), at the other extreme when ! 1 and the home …nal good producer has
The Benchmark Model with Political Economy
We have thus far assumed that each country's government is benevolent and seeks to maximize the aggregate welfare of its residents. Both casual and formal evidence suggest, however, that it is more realistic to formulate a social welfare function that weights asymmetrically the welfare of di¤erent groups in society. The political economy literature has stressed the role of special interest groups in generating these biases in policy (Baron, 1994, Grossman and Helpman, 1996) .
In this section, we extend the Benchmark Model to allow for government welfare functions that place a higher weight on producer welfare than on consumer welfare. In light of analogous results reported for example in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Ch. 10) , it might be expected that the introduction of political economy motives can eliminate unrealistic features of the Benchmark Model's policy predictions (e.g., convert import subsidies to import tari¤s), and in Appendix A.2 we show that this is indeed the case. In the main text, we focus on a di¤erent point: when the foreign government is motivated by political economy concerns and wishes to redistribute surplus towards its input producers, a novel ine¢ ciency can be identi…ed in the Nash equilibrium which is not associated with international cost-shifting. Below we establish this point, and we illustrate and interpret the novel role for a trade agreement in this setting. For simplicity, we continue to refer to the Benchmark Model with political economy as simply the Benchmark Model.
Introducing Political Economy
To represent political-economy motives, we implicitly assume that producers are in a better position to solve the "collective action" problem and hence can better coordinate their demands on the government. We also assume that the ownership of productive assets is highly concentrated, so that we can ignore the role of producers as consumers and as receivers of lump-sum tax rebates.
In particular, we let:
where j represents the weight that the government of country j places on the welfare of its producers, with political-economy motives present in country j if and only if j > 1.
To interpret the problem that a trade agreement can solve in this setting, it is useful to express the conditions for e¢ cient and Nash policies in terms of the local and international prices that these policies induce. We therefore begin by de…ning the international price of the input x, which we denote by p x . In words, p x is the (untaxed) price negotiated in stage 3 for the exchange of inputs between the foreign supplier and the home producer. It is easy to see that in the Benchmark all of the bargaining power, the home government need not concern itself with extracting surplus from foreign input suppliers and hence^
Model this price is given by p x = F =x + (1 + F x ), which can be written as
wherex( H 1 ; x ) is de…ned by (5). Given that the world price of the …nal good 1 is …xed by assumption, the international price p x plays the role of the terms of trade between the home and foreign country in the Benchmark Model. Notice that (19) implies
Using (19) and (5), it can also be derived that
where the inequality follows from condition (2). Hence, a rise in H x improves the home terms of trade. Moreover, it is easy to show that @p x @ H x must be greater than 1, and therefore (20) implies that @p x @ F x must be greater than 0. Hence, a rise in F x improves the foreign terms of trade. Next, we de…ne the home-country price of the input x by
Similarly, we de…ne the foreign-country price of the input x by
Finally, notice that p H x p F x = x , and recall that p H 1 = 1 + H 1 . This implies that we may expresŝ x equivalently as a function of local home and foreign prices:
. Below we will continue to make use of the functionx( H 1 ; x ), but it will sometimes be convenient to use the equivalent function
. With these de…nitions, we are now ready to express home and foreign welfare as functions of local and international prices. In particular, letting
for notational ease, we may write the welfare of the home and foreign governments in the (politically augmented)
Benchmark Model as
Here and throughout this section, we use W j to represent the objectives of government j when expressed as a function of prices.
Notice that, with subscripts on the welfare functions denoting partial derivatives, expressions (21) and (22) imply
and so
This re ‡ects the fact that the income e¤ect of the terms-of-trade change embodied in the rise of p x -holding local prices …xed -is given simply by the trade volume (x), and amounts to a pure (inframarginal) transfer of rents from the home country to the foreign country.
This property is also re ‡ected in the fact that the sum of home and foreign welfare is independent of p x . In particular, we may write world welfare as
An implication is that e¢ ciency imposes conditions only on H 1 and x , con…rming the analogous …nding reported in the previous section.
Using the welfare expressions given in (21) and (22) and the prices de…ned above, we may now express the conditions that the e¢ cient policies HE 1 and E x must satisfy:
and
where in writing (25) 
. With these steps we may rewrite the e¢ ciency condition in (25) in the equivalent form:
where we have also used
Together (24) and (26) describe e¢ cient policies. The condition in (24) says that at e¢ cient policies, a small change in x must have no …rst-order impact on world welfare. The condition in (26) states that small changes in H 1 and H x that hold …xed p x and hence p F x must have no …rst-order impact on world welfare either.
It is interesting to pause here and consider further the implications of the e¢ ciency condition in (26). As we noted in the previous section, in a setting where international prices are determined by market clearing, changes in home-country policies that leave equilibrium international prices unchanged must also leave international trade volumes unchanged (and vice versa), and hence must leave foreign-country welfare unchanged, a feature that supplies the basis for the well-known Kemp-Wan Theorem (Kemp and Wan, 1976) and that is emphasized as well in Bagwell and Staiger (2001) . But here, with international prices determined by bilateral bargaining, this feature does not hold. In fact, using (5) and (19), it can be shown that
where the inequality again follows from (2). Evidently, an increase in H 1 that is accompanied by a change in H x which prevents p x from changing must reduce the equilibrium volume of input tradê x, and will therefore in general have impacts on foreign welfare as well as home welfare. For this reason, at the e¢ cient policies, the impacts of these tari¤ changes on both home and foreign welfare must be considered, as is re ‡ected in the e¢ ciency condition in (26).
Consider next the Nash policy choices, HN 1 , HN x and F N x . Using the fact that
these policies are de…ned by the solutions to the three …rst-order conditions
To con…rm that Nash policies are ine¢ cient, we add together the middle and bottom expressions in (28) and use (20) and (23) to derive a …rst implication of Nash policies:
wherex N 
It is direct from (29) that the e¢ ciency condition in (24) is not satis…ed at the Nash policies, and that world welfare could be increased by reducing x below the Nash level N x . Moreover, it is clear from (30) that the e¢ ciency condition in (26) is satis…ed at Nash policies if and only if at Nash policies it is also true that
Intuitively, as we have emphasized above, the changes in H 1 and H x that hold …xed p x as described in e¢ ciency condition (26) will in general impact both home and foreign welfare; but as the Nash condition (30) indicates, when the home government selects its Nash levels of H 1 and H x it is of course sensitive to how such adjustments impact its own welfare, but it is not sensitive to how such adjustments impact the welfare of the foreign country. Hence, these Nash policy choices will only be e¢ cient if (31) holds so that there is, in fact, no impact on the welfare of the foreign country of changes in H 1 and H x that hold …xed p x when these impacts are evaluated at Nash policies. But it can be con…rmed that, when evaluated at Nash policies, (31) does not hold and that the expression on the left-hand-side of (31) is strictly negative, which is to say that at the Nash policies the foreign country is hurt by the reduction inx implied by these policy adjustments; and so it is apparent that the e¢ ciency condition in (26) is not satis…ed at the Nash policies either.
We may therefore conclude that Nash policies remain ine¢ cient in the Benchmark Model when political economy considerations are introduced. This is not surprising, given that the international cost-shifting motive is still active when political economy motives are also present, and as we have already demonstrated these cost-shifting motives lead to ine¢ cient policy choices. The more interesting question is whether international cost-shifting motives continue to be the only source of Nash ine¢ ciency in the presence of political economy motives. We turn to this question next. 25 
The Role of Trade Agreements
We now ask whether the ine¢ ciency of Nash policies can be attributed solely to international costshifting motives -or equivalently, to "terms-of-trade manipulation"-in the (politically augmented) Benchmark Model. To this end, we follow Bagwell and Staiger (1999) , as those tari¤s that satisfy the three conditions
Having de…ned politically optimal tari¤s in this way, we may then ask whether politically optimal tari¤s are e¢ cient, and thereby determine whether the Nash ine¢ ciencies identi…ed above can be given a terms-of-trade interpretation, according to which the fundamental problem faced by governments in designing their trade agreement is to …nd a way to eliminate terms-of-trade manipulation.
To assess the e¢ ciency properties of politically optimal tari¤s, we add together the middle and bottom expressions in (32) to derive a …rst implication of politically optimal policies:
And we solve the middle expression in (32) 
It is direct from (33) that the condition for e¢ ciency in (24) is satis…ed at politically optimal tari¤s. However, at politically optimal policies it can be con…rmed that
Hence, in the presence of foreign political economy forces ( F > 1), (34) and (35) imply that politically optimal tari¤s violate the condition for e¢ ciency in (26).
Evidently, when F > 1 politically optimal tari¤s are not e¢ cient and the Nash ine¢ ciencies identi…ed above cannot be given a terms-of-trade interpretation. Rather, as (34) and (35) indicate, beginning from politically optimal policies, a small increase in H 1 coupled with a change in H x that leaves p x unchanged (and hence with F x …xed also leaves p F x unchanged) will lead to a secondorder loss for Home (according to (34)) but results in a …rst-order gain for Foreign (according to (35)), and H x and F x can then be adjusted holding x …xed so as to compensate Home for the second-order loss and still leave Foreign with a …rst-order gain from this maneuver. 26 It is instructive to consider further the nature of the additional Pareto gains that a trade agreement can generate in this setting beyond eliminating international cost-shifting motives and thereby providing governments with an avenue of escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners' Dilemma. To this end, recall from (27) that the equilibrium trade volumex must fall as a result of the policy adjustments described just above which improve upon the politically optimal policies. Moreover, it is readily established that, at the political optimum, the politically motivated foreign government is o¤ering an export subsidy to its input producers. Hence, with the foreign export subsidy held …xed at its politically optimal level F P O x < 0, the changes in H 1 and H x described above induce budgetary savings for the foreign government in the amount of
j dp x =0 ], and these savings are evidently su¢ ciently valued by the foreign government to outweigh the cost to it at the political optimum of the reduction in income by the amount
j dp x =0 ] that foreign input producers su¤er. We may therefore conclude that the nature of the additional Pareto gains that we have characterized above amount to coordinating home policies to help lower the budgetary burden of the foreign program of export promotion, and thereby reduce the dead weight loss associated with the foreign desire to redistribute surplus toward its exporters. 27 We summarize this result in:
Proposition 6 When the foreign government objectives include political economy considerations in the Benchmark Model, a trade agreement serves two roles: it eliminates ine¢ ciencies associated with international cost-shifting motives; and it coordinates the setting of policies across countries so as to reduce the dead weight loss associated with export promotion programs for traded intermediate inputs.
2 6 An alternative way to see the non-terms-of-trade problem that arises in this setting is to examine the nature of the international policy externalities in the Nash equilibrium. Using the Nash …rst-order conditions it is direct to establish that these policy externalities take the following form:
> 0, where all magnitudes are evaluated at Nash policies. As these expressions indicate, for F > 1 there are three channels through which policy externalities are transmitted in the Nash equilibrium: changes in p x , changes inx and changes in p F x . When F = 1, the last of these channels is shut down, and as we describe further in our working paper the problem created by the …rst two channels can be given a terms-of-trade interpretation. When F > 1 and the third channel is operative, the problem for a trade agreement to solve moves beyond providing governments with an avenue of escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners'Dilemma.
2 7 It might be conjectured that this …nding hinges on the foreign country being small in the world market for the …nal good, so that it is unable to use its …nal good tari¤ to alter …nal good prices in the home-country market by itself. But as we show in the online Appendix, allowing the foreign country to be large in the world market for the …nal good does not alter our basic …nding.
Notice that, as is re ‡ected in Proposition 6, it is the foreign political economy forces that prevent the politically optimal policies from being e¢ cient. More generally, however, in the presence of symmetric home-supplier/foreign-producer relationships (which for example could be introduced into the Benchmark Model with the addition of a mirror-image second sector with the roles of Home and Foreign reversed), political economy forces in either country will interfere with the e¢ ciency properties of the political optimum. 28 Our (politically augmented) Benchmark Model therefore formally identi…es a separate "political externality" for a trade agreement to address when o¤shoring is prevalent. 29 The identi…cation of a political externality is in stark contrast to the predictions of the terms-of-trade theory, where the presence of political economy motives has no impact on the nature of the problem that a trade agreement must solve.
Finally, notice that according to Proposition 6, the problem that a trade agreement must address varies with the political preferences of member governments. This carries an important implication: when o¤shoring is present, simple and general rules that can help governments negotiate to e¢ cient policy choices may be unavailable. For example, Staiger (1999, 2002) have argued that the GATT/WTO pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination can be interpreted from the perspective of the terms-of-trade theory as simple rules that, under a broad range of possible political economy motives, work to eliminate international cost-shifting and help governments achieve the e¢ cient political optimum. But as we have just shown and as Proposition 6 re ‡ects, when governments have political economy motives politically optimal tari¤s are not e¢ cient in the presence of o¤shoring, and so in this setting reciprocity and non-discrimination cannot be counted on to deliver e¢ cient outcomes. Moreover, it is easily established that our earlier Proposition 5 applies as well in the presence of political economy forces. As a consequence, under the view that governments operate in the presence of important political economy forces, the growing prevalence of o¤shoring is likely to make it increasingly di¢ cult for governments to rely on traditional GATT/WTO concepts and rules -such as market access, reciprocity and non-discrimination -to help them solve their trade-related problems.
Sensitivity
In this section we consider the generality of our central …ndings to various alternative modeling assumptions. For simplicity, we return to the setting of section 3 in which governments do not possess political economy motives. Our main conclusion is that, in each of the extensions that we consider, the role of a trade agreement continues to be to correct both the ine¢ ciently low input trade volume and the ine¢ ciency in the home-market …nal good price that arise under Nash policies, implying that our central …ndings of section 3 as embodied in Propositions 4 and 5 then continue to hold.
Below, we develop two extensions of our framework in some detail and then proceed to brie ‡y outline a few other extensions, which are covered more extensively in the online Appendix.
Secondary Market
In the Benchmark Model we have assumed that the lack of an ex-post contractual agreement leaves both parties with no time to attempt to transact with alternative producers, and thus the outside options in the bargaining are equal to 0. We now explore the robustness of our results to the case in which there exists a secondary market for inputs. 30 In order to explicitly derive the payo¤s associated with the secondary market we now assume that good 1 comes in two types, a customized type T and a generic type G, and that consumer preferences are given by
Note that the preferences in (36) are such that consumers are willing to buy both types of good 1 only if the price of the generic relative to that of the customized type is equal to . This is analogous to consumers perceiving the two goods as perfect substitutes up to a quality shifter. By an appropriate choice of units, we can set the (…xed) price of customized inputs on world markets equal to 1, and that of generic inputs to .
The technology for producing …nal goods and intermediate inputs is as in our Benchmark Model.
The only di¤erence between the two types of good 1 is that the production of a generic good G uses an intermediate input x that is not customized to the producer's needs.
The game we consider is a straightforward extension of that in our Benchmark Model that incorporates a secondary market for inputs. The sequence of events is as in our Benchmark Model, except that our previous stage 4 is now divided into two stages as follows:
stage 4. A small number (formally, a measure-zero countable in…nity) n of the bilateral pairs are exogenously dissolved and randomly rematched in a secondary market. They bargain again according to the same generalized Nash bargaining solution as in stage 3. No further inputs can be produced; the amount produced in stage 2 is perceived as generic in the secondary market because it was tailored to another producer's speci…cations with probability one.
stage 5. Each producer in H imports x from its partner-supplier and produces the …nal good with the acquired x, and payments agreed in stages 3 and 4 are settled.
We focus directly on deriving Nash policy choices, assuming as before that the home and foreign governments select their respective tari¤s simultaneously in a prior stage 0. Note that given the speci…cation of the secondary market in stage 4, it is easy to see that the breakup of a single bargaining pair in stage 3 would result in each member of the pair being rematched with probability 1 with a random partner in stage 4. Therefore, stage 4 generates an outside option equal to 1 + H 1 y (x) x x for the …nal good producer and (1 ) 1 + H 1 y (x) x x for the supplier in their negotiations at stage 3. These expressions are valid provided they are nonnegative, and throughout this section we characterize results for the case where these non-negativity constraints are non-binding (though we show in the online Appendix that our qualitative results carry through when these constraints bind). 31 Following analogous steps as in previous sections, it is easy to see that generalized Nash bargaining in stage 3 will leave the …nal good producer in H with a payo¤ equal to 1 + H 1 y (x) x x , with the supplier in F now receiving a stage-3 payo¤ of (1 ) 1 + H 1 y (x) x x . This follows from the fact that the marginal cost of production of generic and customized inputs is the same, so there is no bene…t in not customizing the input for the matched producer in stage 2. As is apparent, these expressions are identical to those applying in our Benchmark Model and, consequently, they lead to the same choice ofx and the same trade policy choices by governments. If we were to assume that the relative bargaining power of suppliers were di¤erent in the "primary"and secondary markets of stages 3 and 4 respectively, then the tari¤ choices would indeed be di¤erent, but the main conclusions from our analysis would remain unaltered. 32 In describing the Benchmark Model, we have emphasized the role of customization in creating the lock-in e¤ect at the heart of the bilateral determination of prices and the holdup problem. As argued in section 2.1, however, the same lock-in e¤ect could be generated by (ex-post) search frictions even in the absence of any customization. To see this, suppose that = 1, so that generic and customized inputs are perfect substitutes, but let search frictions lead to the formation of only n pairs in stage 4, with < 1. It is then clear that the outside option for the …nal good producer is now 1 + H 1 y (x) x x ; while that for a supplier is (1 ) 1 + H 1 y (x) x x . The resulting stage 3 payo¤s for these two agents are 1 + H 1 y (x) x x and (1 ) 1 + H 1 y (x) x x , respectively, just as in the case with customized inputs.
3 1 Beyond determining outside options, stage 4 plays no role in the model, and in particular only the customized type of good 1 will be produced with positive measure in equilibrium.
3 2 To see this, consider the case in which there is generalized Nash bargaining in both stages 3 and 4, but with potentially di¤erent bargaining weights P 2 (0; 1) and S 2 (0; 1), respectively. In such a case, the Nash tari¤ choices are characterized by the following conditions:
; and
where S + P (1 ). It is apparent that^ HN 1 < 0 and it can also be veri…ed that y 0 (x) > 1:
Ex-Ante Lump-Sum Transfers
Our Benchmark Model rules out ex-ante lump-sum transfers between home producers and foreign suppliers. Although this seems a plausible assumption in our international framework where the promises associated with these transfers may be hard to enforce, it is useful to study the robustness of our results to this assumption. For that purpose, we consider the following modi…cation of stage 1 of our Benchmark Model: stage 1. The unit measure of producers in H and suppliers in F are randomly matched, producing a unit measure of matches. Each producer in H and its matched supplier in F bargain over whether to continue their relationship or not and lump-sum transfers are allowed in the bargaining. This stage-1 bargaining is captured by the generalized Nash bargaining solution with weights and (1 ) for the home producer and foreign supplier, respectively, where 2 (0; 1). If the relationship is terminated, both …rms exit; if an agreement is reached, the producer retains the supplier and provides it with a list of customized input speci…cations.
For simplicity, we assume that the remaining stages of the game are as in the Benchmark Model (and, in particular, there is no ex-post secondary market). This implies that at stage 1, the home producer and the foreign supplier anticipate that if they reach an agreement, they stand to obtain a joint payo¤ of
wherex is still given by (5). If instead, an agreement is not reached, both …rms exit and are left with a payo¤ equal to 0. It is straightforward to show that H + F > 0, which implies that all pairs reach an agreement at stage 1. Note, however, that because of the lump-sum transfers, the division of pro…ts between home producers and foreign suppliers is now detached from the ex-post bargaining solution. 33 In particular, we have:
The values of home and foreign welfare are still given by the same equations as in the Benchmark
Model but with these new pro…t levels H and F applying.
We can next turn to study the Nash equilibrium policy choices of this variant of the model with lump-sum transfers. Manipulating the …rst-order conditions related to the choices of^
3 3 Still, the equilibrium level ofx will be identical to that in the Benchmark Model, since foreign suppliers choosê x to maximize ex-post payo¤s (thus ignoring ex-ante payments). Again the role of a trade agreement continues to be to correct both the ine¢ ciently low input trade volume and the ine¢ ciently low home-market …nal good price that arise under Nash policies, for any 2 (0; 1). To con…rm this, one can manipulate the …rst-order conditions to derive
which implies thatx < x E . And it is evident that^ HN 1 < 0 for < 1, and so our model continues to predict as well that there are distortions in the …nal good market (p H 1 is too low) that arise as a result of the home-country's attempts to extract bargaining surplus from foreign suppliers.
Other Extensions
We …nally outline a few other extensions of our Benchmark Model that we have studied. Due to space constraints, we do not report most mathematical details, although they can be found in the online Appendix.
A. Vertical Integration
Up to now we have not taken a stance as to whether the home producer and foreign supplier are vertically related or not. According to the transaction-cost approach to the boundaries of the …rm (c.f., Coase, 1936 , Williamson, 1985 , vertical integration would arise precisely when the hold-up ine¢ ciencies that we have modeled above become large relative to the larger "governance" costs of running an integrated organization. Under that view, the novel role for trade agreements in the presence of o¤shoring that we have identi…ed might disappear if all production decisions are taken by a vertically-integrating …nal good producer and no bargaining over prices occurs.
Nevertheless, the property-rights approach to the theory of the …rm (c.f., Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990) has persuasively argued that …rm boundaries are better understood as determining the relative bargaining power of producers (via the allocation of residual rights of control inherent in the ownership of productive physical assets) rather than as a¤ecting the space of contracts available to economic agents. Under this interpretation, the role for trade agreements that our Benchmark Model identi…es would still apply to vertically integrated cross-border production relationships. A crude way to capture the essence of the property-rights theory of the …rm in terms of the Benchmark Model would be to associate international outsourcing relationships with a low value of (the bargaining power of home producers) as compared to the value of applying to international insourcing relationships. With this interpretation, our …nding in the Benchmark Model that the role of a trade agreement is not sensitive to the particular value of 2 (0; 1) then suggests as well that the presence or absence of vertical integration would not alter the role of a trade agreement. 34 While one could study how the integration decision (i.e., the optimal choice of ) interacts with trade policy in our framework, such analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 35 
B. Multiple Foreign Countries and Search Costs
In the Benchmark Model, we have restricted our analysis to situations in which home producers can only search for suppliers in F . It is straightforward to show that at least some of our results could be overturned when this restriction is relaxed. To see this, consider the case in which there is a second "foreign"country, denoted by S for "South,"with an additional unit measure of potential suppliers identical to those in F . Assume that F and S are identical in every other respect, including preferences, technology and bargaining strength. Under these circumstances and as long as F x > S x , all home producers will prefer to match with southern suppliers over suppliers in F . As a result, the government in F will have an incentive to reduce its export tax below the southern one. Pushing this argument further, it is straightforward to show then that the optimal foreign and southern export taxes that emerge from this variant of the model are negative (i.e., they are subsidies) and Home ends up capturing all the welfare gains from o¤shoring. 36 As a result, the mix of policies^ This example, however, is special in a number of ways. To begin with, the assumption that F and S are symmetric is not innocuous: if one of the two foreign countries has a comparative advantage in supplying inputs, it can (and will) maintain a positive export tax (analogous to "limit pricing"in the case of Bertrand competition among …rms), and the result of our Benchmark Model is then preserved. More importantly, the structure of the example above imposes that home producers …nd a match with probability one, no matter where they search for suppliers. As emphasized by Grossman and Helpman (2005) , an important feature of o¤shoring relationships is the costly search for suitable partners. The same characteristics that make o¤shoring relationships contractually di¢ cult (i.e., customization, international enforceability of contracts, etc.) preclude the existence of a frictionless competitive market for inputs or for suppliers. In the online Appendix, we explicitly introduce these search frictions and con…rm that the central …ndings of our Benchmark Model are 3 4 This is not to say that the presence or absence of vertically integrated home producers and foreign suppliers would be irrelevant for the nature of trade agreements. On the contrary, to the extent that international factor ownership associated with vertically integrated multinational …rms alters the objective functions of each government, the nature of trade agreements could be very much a¤ected (see Blanchard, 2006) . Rather, our point is simply that vertical integration does not by itself obviate the novel role for a trade agreement that our Benchmark Model identi…es.
3 5 Note that vertical integration may be optimal for …nal-good producers whenever is su¢ ciently small, despite the fact that supplier underinvestment will be aggravated by such integration. This is due to the constraints on ex-ante transfers in our framework (see Acemoglu et al., 2007) .
3 6 The logic is analogous to that behind the fact that Bertrand competition implies marginal-cost pricing.
robust to the introduction of multiple foreign countries where inputs may be sourced. We refer the reader to the online Appendix for the details.
C. Ad Valorem Tari¤s
We have assumed throughout that tari¤s on …nal goods and intermediate inputs are speci…c. It is straightforward to verify that nothing substantive changes if the …nal good tari¤s are expressed in ad valorem terms. The case of ad valorem import tari¤ on intermediate inputs is more interesting.
In particular, in the online Appendix, we show that ad valorem input tari¤s introduce a novel channel through which bargaining between the home producer and foreign supplier can be a¤ected.
Despite this novel channel, however, we con…rm that the role played by an international trade agreement remains the same.
The key new feature associated with ad-valorem tari¤s is that these instruments a¤ect the slope of the bargaining frontier between the home producer and the foreign supplier. A positive ad valorem import tari¤ or export tax makes this slope steeper, because the producer and supplier are then penalized for shifting surplus toward the foreign supplier through a high price p x . On the other hand, a negative ad valorem tari¤ (an import or export subsidy) makes the slope of the bargaining frontier ‡atter, thus encouraging transfers of surplus toward the foreign supplier. 37
This constitutes a novel channel through which ad valorem trade taxes can a¤ect the severity of the international hold-up problem. This channel is not present when a speci…c tari¤ is instead utilized, because the slope of the bargaining frontier between producer and supplier is 1 independent of the level of the speci…c tari¤s H x and F x . When solving for the Nash equilibrium taxes in this setup, however, we con…rm the key ine¢ ciencies existing in our Benchmark Model (see online Appendix for details). Hence, while the mechanisms through which speci…c and ad valorem tari¤s on traded inputs in ‡uence the international hold-up problem are distinct, the broad conclusions are similar to those obtained above.
Combining this with our earlier observation that the form of the …nal good tari¤ is immaterial, we may conclude that the central …ndings of our Benchmark Model are robust to the form (ad valorem or speci…c) that tari¤s take, despite the di¤erent mechanisms that operate in the two environments. 38 3 7 We abstract here from the possibility that …rms might engage in transfer-pricing-type behavior in order to avoid trade taxes or collect trade subsidies. In our setting, this amounts to assuming that …rms do not have other (non-price) means to transfer surplus between them in their bilateral bargain. If they did have such means, then the price they negotiate would be determined completely by the sign of the trade taxes subject only to the ability of governments to regulate such behavior. Even without such means, the …rms in our model do respond to government trade taxes by negotiating di¤erent prices, but at least when these …rms are taken to be engaged in arms-length transactions this would not be interpreted as transfer pricing in the traditional sense.
3 8 It is interesting to observe that the novel channel through which ad valorem tari¤s alter the bargaining outcome between home producer and foreign supplier -namely, the slope of the bargaining frontier -also suggests that these policy instruments may have a broader class of applicability with regard to their ability to mitigate international hold-up problems than is the case for speci…c tari¤s. For example, if x were reinterpreted as the unveri…able quality of a …xed unit to be traded, so that tari¤ policy could not then be conditioned on x, a speci…c tari¤ on trade in x would lose its ability to a¤ect the hold-up problem, but an ad valorem tari¤ would continue to be useful in this regard.
D. Domestic Suppliers
Our Benchmark Model assumes that home …nal good producers never purchase intermediate inputs from local suppliers located at home. One may wonder whether this assumption is important for our results. In the online Appendix, we show that the presence of local suppliers may a¤ect the positive implications of our model for the type and sign of policy instruments that will be used by governments in the Nash equilibrium, but it does not signi…cantly a¤ect the nature of second-best trade policies, and more importantly, it does not a¤ect the substantive results of the Benchmark Model regarding the role of trade agreements. The reason for this is that distortions (if any) in the provision of domestic inputs at home are optimally targeted through the use of domestic subsidies to input producers at home. But second-best policies will naturally include domestic subsidies that are set in a way that eliminates domestic hold-up problems and, hence, this extended model essentially collapses to our Benchmark Model, with the second-best policies of the extended model analogous to those in our Benchmark Model (with the addition of domestic input subsidies at home).
If investments by domestic suppliers at home are independent of those by foreign suppliers (say because …nal good producers buy only from foreign suppliers or from domestic suppliers, but not from both), then Nash policy choices are also identical to those in our Benchmark Model. As shown in the online Appendix, matters become more complicated when locally-provided inputs are either complements or substitutes with respect to the inputs provided by suppliers in Foreign. In such a case, the home government will not fully internalize the e¤ect of domestic subsidies to its suppliers on foreign welfare, and the provision of these subsidies will in general be ine¢ cient. This in turn complicates characterizing the sign of the remaining policy instruments used in the Nash policy game (i.e., the input trade taxes charged by the home and foreign governments as well as the …nal good trade tax imposed by the home government). Nevertheless, in the online Appendix we show that these policies continue to diverge from the second-best policies, so there is still a role for trade agreements. Furthermore, the home country now has the ability to a¤ect the international price p x through three di¤erent policy instruments, and this only reinforces our main conclusions regarding the need to extend trade agreements to a wider set of policies.
E. Two-Sided Investments
Our modeling of …nal good production in the Benchmark Model is exceedingly simple. In the online Appendix, we also consider the case in which transforming the supplier's intermediate input into a …nal good requires an additional relationship-speci…c investment (or input) on the part of the …nal good producer, as in the property-rights model of Antràs (2003 Antràs ( , 2005 and Antràs and Helpman (2004) . It turns out that the analysis is essentially identical to a variant of the model with domestic suppliers described before, where …nal good producers play the role of these domestic suppliers. In this variant of the model, it is again the case that the second-best policies are identical to those in our Benchmark Model, except for the introduction of a subsidy to the provision of the …nal good producer's input. The Nash policy choices depart from those in our Benchmark Model, but they do so in an analogous manner to the case with domestic suppliers (see online Appendix for details).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have initiated the study of trade agreements in the presence of o¤shoring. Our …ndings indicate that the rise of o¤shoring is likely to complicate the task of trade agreements for two reasons. First, the mechanism by which countries can shift the costs of intervention on to their trading partners is more complicated in the presence of o¤shoring and extends to a wider set of policies than is the case when o¤shoring is not present, and this implies that the agreements themselves must extend to a wider set of policies as well. And second, the underlying problem that a trade agreement must address in the presence of o¤shoring varies with the political preferences of member governments. As a consequence, we have argued that the growing prevalence of o¤shoring is likely to make it increasingly di¢ cult for governments to rely on traditional GATT/WTO concepts and rules to help them solve their trade-related problems.
Our paper raises many new questions, both theoretical and empirical. A …rst question is empirical: Are international prices best thought of in the modern global economy as determined through countless bilateral bargains between buyers and sellers, or rather through anonymous market clearing mechanisms? Naturally, the answer to this question is likely to vary by sector. For example, market-clearing may still be the dominant mechanism for international price determination in many of the manufacturing industries that have formed the traditional focus of liberalization e¤orts under GATT, but bilateral bargaining over prices is probably the norm in the service sector, which comprises an important and growing segment of the WTO liberalization agenda. If this dichotomy is roughly accurate, Can the forces we identify here help explain the WTO's relative lack of success in facilitating liberalization in the service sector?
More broadly, to the extent that international prices are determined through bilateral bargains between buyers and sellers, Do the trade policy stances of governments in practice have systematic impacts on bargaining outcomes and, through this channel, on trade volumes? Which aspects of the evolving architecture of the GATT/WTO might be best understood from the perspective of the theory we develop here as responses to the rise of o¤shoring in the world economy? And as we have suggested might be so in the speci…c case of services, Does the changing nature of international trade more generally indicate the need for fundamental changes in the nature of regional and multilateral institutions that govern the world trading system? These and related questions strike us as especially fertile areas for further research. Consider …rst the second-order condition for the choice of 
But using the implicit function theorem on (5), we have y 00 (x) , which is negative only if 1 + + xy 000 (x) =y 00 (x) > 0. As an example, assume that y (x) = x = , with 2 (0; 1). In such case, we have y 00 (x) = ( 1) x 2 and y 000 (x) = ( 2) ( 1) x 3 , and hence 1 + + xy 000 (x) =y 00 (x) = 1 + , which is indeed positive. The fact that in the Nash equilibrium we have^ H 1 6 = 0 implies that the second-order conditions for the choice of H 1 and H x are quite cumbersome to characterize, as they will now also involve properties of the demand function. Throughout the paper, we simply assume that they are satis…ed without providing the exact conditions needed.
We next, however, develop a particular case of our model where the second order conditions are easy to characterize and simple comparative statics can be obtained. In particular, we make the simplifying assumption that demand for the …nal good is perfectly elastic, which implies that^ H 1 = 0. Under this assumption note that it is su¢ cient to check that @ 2 W H =@ H x 2 < 0, which requires that
Imposing @W H =@ H x = 0 to eliminate -, we can simplify the above expression to:
y 00 (x) < 0,
This requires 1 +~ +~ xy 000 (x) =y 00 (x) > 0, where~ = 1 . Remember, however, that above we have con…rmed that in our parametric example, we indeed have 1 +~ +~ xy 000 (x) =y 00 (x) > 0 for any~ 2 (0; 1).
A.2. Nash Policy Choices with Political Economy
In this Appendix we show that the introduction of political economy motives can eliminate unrealistic features of the Benchmark Model's policy predictions (i.e., convert import subsidies to import tari¤s and export taxes to export subsidies). In light of the welfare functions derived in section 4.1, the …rst-order conditions that de…ne the Nash policies^ can be written as (it is straightforward to show that introduction of political economy does not create a reason for F to utilize 
which naturally reduces to the analogous equation (9) in the Benchmark Model when H = 1. Notice that for low enough H (in particular H < 1= ), the home government continues to …nd it optimal in the Nash equilibrium to set a positive export tax (or import subsidy) on the …nal good. Nevertheless, when the weight that the home government places on producer surplus becomes su¢ ciently high (i.e., H > 1= ),^ HN 1 ‡ips sign according to (9) and (38) and becomes positive. In such a case, the home government puts in place a Nash trade policy that leads to an increase in the domestic price of the …nal good (i.e., an import tari¤ or export subsidy). As we have shown above, these policies tend to transfer surplus from the home country to the foreign country, but a su¢ ciently politically in ‡uenced home government is willing to allow this because consumers bear a disproportionate part of the cost of this rent-dissipation.
Further manipulation of the …rst-order conditions also deliverŝ
F 1 x @x=@ F x , which indicates that for large enough F (in particular F > 1= (1 )), the foreign government no longer sets an export tax in the Nash equilibrium but rather chooses to subsidize exports of intermediate inputs.
Intuitively, although a subsidy reduces foreign tari¤ revenue by an amount which is strictly larger than the amount by which foreign pro…ts increase, a su¢ ciently politically in ‡uenced foreign government weights the latter e¤ect disproportionately more, and thus sets a positive export subsidy in the Nash equilibrium.
